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The increasing availability and use of congressional roll call 
data and of interest groups' ratings of congressmen has resulted in a 
steady stream of studies that contribute to our understanding 
individual members' voting decisions.1 Furthermore, building onto
earlier findings, more recent studies have synthesized ostensibly 
competing models into eclectic, improved accounts of voting decisions 
(Kingdon, 1 977) . A lingering puzzle, however, is that few empirical 
studies make the seemingly natural transition from the individual 
level, at which voting decisions are predicted, to the aggregate 
level, at which congressional outcomes are predicted, The basis for 
the refusal or reluctance to study congressional outcomes cannot be an 
absence of theory, since theories of committee decision-making are 
among the oldest in our discipline (Black and Newing, 1951; Black, 
1958) , and since recent extensions are increasingly motivated by an 
interest in congressional decision-making, first by standing 
committees and then by members of the parent body (Shepsle, 1979; 
Denzau and Mackay, 1983; Krehbiel, 1983) . What, then, precludes 
empirical tests of theories of aggregate congressional outcomes? 
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This study is predicated by a diagnosis of the problem not as 
undeveloped theory nor as unavailable data, but rather as the absence 
of a useful technique for considering theory and data jointly. Formal 
theories as well as informal accounts of congressional decision-making 
typically assume that congressmen have policy preferences that play an 
important part in individual votes and aggregate outcomes, Although 
many studies use roll call votes and interest groups' ratings of 
members as proxies for preferences, and although several studies 
actually locate different members on different points of some 
underlying continuum, the practical meaning of such ratings, scores, 
and continua remains vague, if not suspect (Fowler, 1982) . To 
illustrate, suppose that two relatively liberal MCs � X and Y have 
ADA scores of 70 and 90, respectively, Even if the difference in 
scores is sufficiently large to justify the statement "Y is more 
liberal than X," this information is minimally useful for prediction, 
Were the Congress to consider a proposal to spend some specified 
moderate amount of money on a social program, the scores do not tell 
us which if either member will vote for it. And the scores offer even 
less assistance in predicting the congressional outcome, that is, the 
actual amount of expenditure approved by a requisite congressional 
majority, 
The key problem is that the metric of the scores differs from the 
metric(s) of actual congressional proposals. Abstract scores (however 
they may be derived) cannot be placed on concrete dimensions such as 
dollars, nor can concrete proposals be assigned values that correspond 
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to the units of abstract scores. The proposed solution to this 
problem is a simple, easily employable technique that permits the 
mapping of abstract scores onto a concrete policy dimension. In the 
first section, the assumptions of the technique are discussed and 
their underlying rationale is exposed with a hypothetical example. 
The second section is a demonstration using actual congressional data. 
The final section is a discussion of problems one might confront in 
future applications. 
I. THE TECHNIQUE 
Estimation and inference cannot occur without a maintained model. 
Accordingly, an initial challenge is to shun the trap of embedding in 
the maintained model assumptions that subsequently may be put to a 
test. Although the principal concern is to devise a way to test 
theories about congressional outcomes, most such theories explicitly 
build upon assumptions about individual choice. Thus to make strict 
assumptions about individual choice or to make vague assertions about 
how institutions generate outcomes would be to risk assuming the 
results of potential tests. The problem is a difficult one and the 
proposed solution -- like most solutions to difficult problems -- may 
be less than ideal, It is defensible, however, on the grounds that it 
is intuitively plausible and a reasonable starting point. 
The objective is to project abstract scores of congressmen onto a 
concrete dimension whose values correspond with values of proposals on 
which congressmen decide.2 For each congressman an unobserved ideal 
point is estimated as a specified function of an observed score. 
Estimation is made possible by exploiting roll call votes on, and 
quantitative content of, two or more proposals, and by invoking two 
assumptions. The first assumption escapes dubious individual-level 
determinism (e.g., "All members vote for the alternative closest to 
their ideal point.") by focusing instead on average scores of members 
in the coalition that supports a given proposal. The second 
assumption posits a linear relationship between observed scores and 
unobserved ideal points. 
4 
Assumption 1. Given a recorded roll call vote on a proposal that 
possesses a known value on a concrete dimension, we assume that 
the average score of the members who vote "yea" on the proposal 
corresponds to an unobservable ideal point equal to the value of 
the proposal, The relationship can be represented as an ordered 
pair of values called an anchor, which can be represented as a 
point in a two-dimensional space, 
We adopt these formalizations: 
xi is an actual (unobserved) ideal point of member i, 
and takes on values comparable to the issue under 
consideration, 
xi is an estimate of xi' 
si is an abstract score for member i, 
ej is the concrete value of the jth proposal put to a vote, 
Yj is the set of members who vote yea on ej' 
a(Yj) is the average score of members who vote yea on ej' 
i.e., Ttf � si' and J ie j 
Aj is an anchor for proposal ej. 
Thus, it follows from assumption 1 that an anchor, Aj, for proposal,
ej, equals (s(Yj),6j).
Assumption 2. Ideal points are linear functions of scores. 
Formally, xi = a  +psi, where a and p are parameters to becomputed or estimated from anchors. 
The technique requires at least two roll call votes on proposals 
with values on the same concrete dimension. Consider decision-making 
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on the Senate floor on appropriations for a social program. Suppose a 
bill states that $70 million shall be appropriated for the program. 
Liberals regard the amount as too small and propose an amendment to 
raise the figure to $100 million. Thus e1 = $100 million. A vote is
taken on the amendment, and 40 senators, mostly liberals, vote yea. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the amendment to receive a majority of 
votes, the roll call is useful information if accompanied with a score 
that purports to discriminate between members on issues such as the 
one under consideration. For social programs, scores of the Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA), for example, are appropriate. Under 
assumption 1, the mean score of the 40 supportive senators, s(Y1), is 
computed and paired with an ideal point equal to the value of the 
proposal, e1 = $100 million. Suppose the average score of yea voters
is 75. The anchor, A1 = (75,100), therefore represents a mapping from 
75 on the abstract horizontal axis (ADA scores) onto $100 million on 
the concrete vertical axis (appropriations), as shown in figure 1. 
Now suppose that conservative senators, having spotted the 
weakness of the liberal coalition, respond with an alternative 
amendment below the $70 million reported by the Appropriations 
x: Appropriations
(in millions) 
61 
6 = 2 
a = 
5a
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Hypothetical Example of Anchors and Parameters 
140 
120 
100 . .. . . .......... .... (75,100) 
80 
. 8 
60 (25,60) 
40 
20 
25 so 75 100 
s: ADA Score
6 
Committee, With the value of e2, the second proposal, equal to $60
million and a record of votes for the proposal by members for whom the 
average ADA score is 25, the second anchor becomes another key point 
in the 2-dimenaional space: A2 = (25,60).
The next step is to estimate a and p which, in the case of two 
anchors, are simply the intercept and slope of a line passing through 
the points, Finally, the linearity assumption is invoked to estimate 
ideal points for each of the 100 Senatora.3 From the data shown in
figure 1, the precise formula for the i'th Senator is: 
-
xi a + P • ai
40 + .8 • ADAi.
Temporary adoption of a spatial perspective of voting helps to 
clarify the rationale underlying the technique, Suppose that the 
distribution of members' true ideal points on some concrete dimension 
is known to be the distribution in figure 2. Now consider the 
proposal, ej' and three specific members whose ideal points are x1,
x2, and x3• The interior region, Yj' is a hypothetical but plausible
frequency distribution of the ideal points of members who vote for the 
proposal. A comparison of the solid vertical lines (from ideal points 
on the horizontal axis to the top of the interior region) with dotted 
lines confirms the intuitive expectation that the nearer ideal points 
are to the proposal, the more likely members with such ideal points 
are to vote for the proposal. Moat members with preferences such as 
member l's will vote yea; almost all members with preferences such as 
member 3'a will vote nay,4
6a 
Figure 2 
Distribution of True Ideal Points 
of Supporters and Nonsupporters of Proposal 6j 
x: true ideal points 
The location of member l's ideal point underscores the 
reasonableness of assumption 1, which subsequently provides leverage 
for the estimates of the ideal points. With the distribution of true 
ideal points of supporters of the proposal as shown, x1 is exactly at
the mean of the distribution. The resulting anchor is said to be 
accurate5 because ultimately it leads to the correct association of
the average score of yea voters, s(Yj)' with the value of the
proposal, aj.
Of course, things may not always work out so nicely. Symmetric 
curves may be common and convenient, but they are not universal. 
Therefore, later we examine congressional situations in which anchors 
may be inaccurate and, consequently, where extra caution should be 
exercised. The next task, however, is to demonstrate the usefulness 
of the technique as a tool for testing hypotheses in a relatively 
"clean" legislative setting. 
II. A CONGRESSIONAL APPLICATION
We demonstrate the potential of the technique by examining an 
issue of probable interest to readers: House authorizations for the 
National Science Foundation for fiscal year 1983. HR 5842 was 
reported by the Science and Technology Committee and came to the floor 
on May 19, 1982, It proposed authorization of $1.099 billion for NSF 
in the coming fiscal year. This amount was considerably greater than 
the authorization and appropriation in the previous fiscal year, and 
it was $30 million above the Reagan Administration's request. 6
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The bill came to the floor under an open rule (HR 459). The 
significance of the rule is that germane amendments were permitted. 
In a setting in which a sizeable increase in NSF funding was requested 
by the committee, and in which Republicans and Southern Democrats were 
striving to continue to exploit the budget cutting mood that was 
prevalent in the previous session of Congress, it is not surprising 
that amendments were indeed offered. Two such amendments serve as 
suitable proposals for computing anchors. The first is a motion by 
Representative Larry Winn (R-KS and ranking minority member of the 
Science and Technology Committee) to authorize $1.069 billion for NSF, 
thereby cutting $30 million from the committee bill and bringing the 
authorization precisely in line with the amount requested by the 
Office of Management and Budget. The Winn amendment passed narrowly, 
194-191, Soon thereafter, an amendment in the form of a substitute 
was offered by Representative Peter Peyser (D-NY), Peyser's amendment 
called for the authorization of $1.089 billion -- $20 million more 
than the Winn proposal but $10 million less than the original proposal 
of the Science and Technology Committee. Peyser's amendment passed 
also, 203-188, 
The situation can be represented straightforwardly on the 
concrete dimension of dollars. The first step is to select an 
appropriate score. Since the authorization in question pertained 
closely to federal funding of education and research, the score should 
reflect domestic liberalism and conservatism. The ratings of the 
League of Women Voters do just that and, accordingly, will be used 
throughout the remainder of the study.7 
As described in section I, anchors are ordered pairs whose first 
value is the mean score of supporters of a proposal and second value 
is the concrete value of the proposal, The average LWV score of 
supporters of the Winn amendment is 40.4, while yea voters on the 
Peyser proposal have an average score of 72.2. Thus these values are 
associated with the dollar values (in billions) of the proposals --
- -
1.069 and 1.089. Next a and p are computed, and individual ideal 
points are estimated according to the resulting linear equation: 
xi = 1,040 + , 000619 • LWVi 
The distribution of estimates is shown in figure 3. Notice that 
the distributions of Winn and Peyser supporters, Y1 and Y2, 
approximate a key feature of the hypothetical distribution in figure 
2: members whose (estimated) ideal points are near the value of the 
amendment are more likely to vote for it than are members whose ideal 
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points are more distant. Furthermore, the distributions of supportive 
voters is reasonably symmetric, although necessarily somewhat lumpy 
due in part to the uneven underlying distribution of scores and in 
part to recoding the estimates in order to display the distributions, 
The distribution of estimated ideal points of course does not 
confirm that the technique works, since by design the technique 
generates estimates that approximate figure 2, Thus evaluation of the 
technique must be based not on its estimates, which necessarily remain 
part of the maintained model, but instead on the usefulness of such 
(f) (f) 
-+-' c 
c o  
&� 
0·L 
Q) 0
-0 _.c � 
--
-+-' j -a .9 a Q) '"" "' 
-+-' LL � OU) 
.Ez 
-+-' (f) L 
W'"8 
0 
<D 
� 
� 
0 
N 
9a 
or N CD 
I L..I G>' 
(/) �' cn' L.. >J Cl> Cl)I.... a..• � 
�' 
I l o'
< 
L..' a..: 
O'al 
r: .s 
.-- cof'"'! .... .. 50::
. O'> j 0 
�-��..- �
co 
8 �2: :; � 
0 
,...: 
� �0 .... '"' "' "'� 
8 .... ·-co ..-
<D 
0 
....: 
I() 
0 
..-
.q-q ..-
0 
estimates to test hypotheses. Three such hypotheses will be 
considered � the committee deference norm, Black's theorem, and the 
majority median hypothesis -- after which other applications are 
discussed. 
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Committee deference. The institutionalization of the committee 
system in Congress is widely discussed and documented (Polsby, 1968; 
Shepsle, 1978, chapter 2; Haeberle, 1978) . A concomitant, if not 
cause or effect, of institutionalization is deference accorded to a 
committee's legislation by noncommittee members when legislation 
reaches the floor. Fenno, for example, reported that about 90 percent 
of the Appropriation Committee's dollars-and-cents recommendations 
were accepted without change on the floor of the House (1966, p.450) . 
If the deference norm is still prevalent, and prevalent even for 
nonexclusive committees such as Science and Technology, noncommittee 
members will generally accept committee legislation as it is reported. 
Amendments, if offered at all, will be minor or soundly defeated. 
On the issue of NSF authorizations, members on the floor 
obviously did not, as a whole, defer to the Science and Technology 
Committee. Two nontrivial amendments were offered and each passed. 
Thus in this instance observations at the aggregate level alone 
sufficiently warrant rejection of the hypothesis. Were such rejection 
not so clear cut, however, -- and in many congressional situations it 
is not � estimates of individual ideal points would permit a more 
discriminating test. Specifically, the deference hypothesis suggests 
that members will oppose all major amendments, regardless of policy 
content. Accordingly, if it were true, there should be no 
relationship between members' propensity to vote to amend committee 
versions of legislation and the distance between proposals and 
members' ideal points. Although it may appear that the deference 
hypothesis is testable using untransformed scores, the appearance is 
false. To obtain the necessary measures of distance, scores and 
proposals must be expressed in comparable units, which, of course, 
they typically are not. 
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The data in table 1 indisputably show that the propensity to 
oppose the Winn amendment is related to distance. Such is the case 
even for Democrats, who, as members of the majority party, presumably 
would be more inclined to defer uniformly to the committee's bill. In 
sum, the norm of deference is overwhelmed by policy preferences. 
Black's theorem. In The Theory of Committees and Elections, 
Duncan Black demonstrated that under majority voting, members with 
single-peaked preferences voting sincerely on alternatives select the 
motion that the median voter prefers to all others. Although Black's 
theorem is old and well-known, its use in theories of congressional 
decision-making are relatively new. In spite of its applicability to 
some congressional settings, such as decisions by "sincere" committees 
or by the Committee of the Whole acting under the open (germaneness) 
rule in "simple jurisdictions" (Shepsle, 1979) , the theorem has not 
been tested empirically because of the aforementioned obstacles. 
Having circumvented them, however, the technique renders the theorem 
testable. In its simplest form, the test merely requires 
Distance from 
Ideal point 
to Amendment 
(in millions) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
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60 
Table 1 
The Counnittee Deference Hypothesis 
(Winn Amendment) 
Percentage of Voters 
Not Deferring to Counnittee 
All Voters Republicans Democrats 
3.7 33.3 2.6 
31.7 76.9 19.1 
59.2 80.0 44.8 
77.9 91.3 50.0 
85 .5 100.0 50.0 
83.3 100.0 50.0 
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identification of the median voter, estimation of his ideal point, and 
comparison of the ideal point, with the observed outcome. In the case 
of NSF authorizations, the 15 median voters' ideal points equal 1.076, 
which is not very close to the Peyser amendment, whose value is 1.089. 
Thus it would appear reasonable to reject this hypothesis also. 
In some instances, such rejection may be too arbitrary, The 
difficulty in answering the question of "how close is close?" is that 
"not very close" in one setting (e.g., $13 million for NSF) indeed may 
be much closer in another (say, a defense authorization in which 
hundreds of billions of dollars are at stake) , While it is impossible 
to escape exercising judgment, predictive closeness can be assessed 
somewhat less subjectively with a procedure analogous to classical 
hypothesis testing. Specifically, given the null hypothesis that the 
median voter's ideal point is not the outcome, and given that the 
median prediction is not likely to be perfect and hence some members' 
ideal points will lie between the median and the actual outcome, one 
may de�ine � priori a cutoff point that specifies the minimum 
percentage of members whose ideal points may lie between these two 
points without calling for rejection of the hypothesis. Thus, if the 
percentage of such members is greater than or equal to the cutoff 
value, the null hypothesis would not be rejected, and implicitly the 
alternate hypothesis (the theorem) would be suspect. But if the 
percentage of such members is less than the cutoff point, the null 
hypothesis would be rejected and the theoretical prediction would be 
supported, 
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On the basis of a cutoff value of 10 percent, Black' s theorem can 
be reconsidered more systematically. The percentage of members whose 
ideal points lie between the median voter and the actual outcome is 
21. 1  percent in the case of NSF authorizations, so the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected: too many members' ideal points lie between the 
predicted and actual outcomes. Therefore, consistent with the earlier 
impressionistic assessment, Black' s theorem is unsupported. 
The maiority median hypothesis. The final hypothesis is a hybrid 
of Black's theorem and the well-known notion of party government. 
Black' s theorem, of course, does not discriminate between party 
members; members have ideal points and those points alone determine 
behavior, which, under the specified conditions, guarantees a median 
outcome. In contrast, a long line of congressional research has 
suggested that voting in Congress is affected by factors other than 
policy preferences. Two alternative classes of influence are party 
and institutional features. Standing committees, such as Science and 
Technology, work with leaders of parties to determine what bills will 
be reported to the floor for consideration. And the Rules Committee 
works with party and committee leaders to determine how bills may be 
changed, including occasional precise specification of proposals that 
may be offered as amendments (Bach, 1981) . Although formal 
theoretical predictions of outcomes resulting from such activities are 
rare or nonexistent, a closely related observation is that party 
leaders are often moderates within their parties. Poole and Smith' s 
(1983) multidimensional unfolding technique, for example, reveals of 
1 4  
the Senate 
the close correspondence over the three year period [1979-
1981] between the location of each type of leader and the median 
locations of their respective parties • • • •  [L]eaders appear to 
be interested in formulating motions that reflect the mainstream 
position of their parties rather than the Senate as a whole. 
(pp. 15-16) 
This finding is suggestive but not readily applicable to specific 
issues on concrete policy dimensions. However, with estimates of 
ideal points, a natural extension of the Poole-Smith observation can 
be examined, namely, the hypothesis that outcomes will be near the 
position of the median voter of the majority party. 
The test is similar to that for Black' s theorem. The majority 
median is 1 , 085, and the actual outcome (the Peyser amendment) is 
1. 089. Inspection of the frequency distribution of estimated ideal 
points reveals that only 4. 6% of the estimated ideal points lie 
between the predicted and observed outcomes. In accordance with the 
procedure described above, the null hypothesis that outcomes will not 
be the majority party medians is rejected. The alternative, majority 
median hypothesis is therefore corroborated. 
The foregoing demonstration of the hypothesis testing 
capabilities of the technique is illustrative but not exhaustive. 
Other applications include the following topics, which usually are 
addressed only theoretically or anecdotally. Estimation of ideal 
points would seem to pave the way for more systematic empirical tests 
of the relevant and sometimes competing theories. 
Amendment strategy. Where are amendments likely to be located 
and which are most likely to pass?8
Agenda construction. To what areas in the policy space do 
leaders and members of the Rules Committee restrict the set of 
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permissible amendments, and to what degree do such proposals represent 
the preferences of members who are unable to participate directly in 
agenda construction? 
Sophisticated voting. Given settings in which agendas are well-
defined and in which members are well informed of their colleagues' 
preferences, do voters "misrepresent" their preferences at early 
stages of voting in order to secure a preferable outcome at later 
stages? 
Sophistication of committees. To what extent do committee 
members strategically place their legislation, incorporating their 
expectations of floor activity (and rules governing amendments) into 
committee decision-making? 
III. CAVEATS
Although the simplicity of the technique is indisputable and its 
scope of applicability is promising, its limitations should 
nevertheless be stressed. Two are obvious: some congressional issues 
cannot be represented on numerical dimensions (for example, abortion, 
school prayer, busing), and on other issues that can be represented 
numerically, attempts to amend legislation may not occur (for example, 
when noncommittee members defer to committees, or when leaders or 
Rules Committee members prohibit amendments), Of course, inability to 
use the technique cannot lead to faulty inference, but misapplication 
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might. Thus, it is appropriate to conclude with an examination of 
congressional situations in which the technique probably should not be 
used. 
Constrained agendas with extreme proposals. Even the most 
noxious proposals muster up a few votes, and if such proposals are the 
only ones available for computing anchors, the anchors may be 
inaccurate, Consider a foreign policy situation in which a highly 
restrictive, closed rule agenda is in effect. Congress is to decide 
between the president's proposal for a $400 million in military aid 
for El Salvador versus the status quo level of $65 million.9 The
agenda is represented as a simple two-branch tree in figure 4a. If 
the distribution of true ideal points, xi' is as depicted in 4b, and
if only a few members vote for the president's proposal as shown by 
the small interior region, then the anchor will be inaccurate. 
Specifically, it pairs the mean score of the members in the shaded 
region, s(Yj), with the value of the proposal ej = 400, when in fact 
s(Yj) should be paired with �(Yj) = 225, the average of true ideal 
points of voters for ej' (The bias in the estimates, xi' that results
from inaccurate anchors is defined and illustrated in the next 
example.) 
While illuminating, such situations are not likely to arise in a 
legislative body that prides itself on considering the proposals its 
members want to consider. Closed rules are increasingly rare, even on 
matters such as taxation which traditionally have been regarded as 
privileged (Rudder, 1977). Moreover, Congress is not likely to have 
b. 
Figure 4 
An Inaccurate Anchor 
from a Constrained Agenda 
a. Agenda 
s 
Status 
Quo 
(65m) 
ej 
President's 
Proposal 
(400m) 
Inaccurate Anchor, Aj 
x: true ideal points 
(millions for El Salvador) 
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its agenda dictated by the president -- not even in foreign policy 
matters.10 Nevertheless, the possibility of inaccurate anchors is 
worth noting, and proposals should be selected with attentiveness to 
the freedom with which members may offer amendments and to the 
reasonableness of proposals under closed or modified-closed rules. 
Unevenly distributed expectations about future, unknown 
proposals. In the case just discussed, members faced a highly 
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constrained agenda and hence had no opportunity to vote for proposals 
widely perceived as acceptable. The contrasting situation is one in 
which the members are offered a choice among a larger set of 
alternatives, and in which one such alternative is, in effect, a 
future but unknown agenda. Such an agenda is illustrated in figure 
Sa, and is patterned after a rule that governed debate on the fiscal 
1983 budget resolution in the House.11 Members were to vote first on 
a Republican substitute to the resolution of the Budget Committee e1 
and then on the Budget Committee's original proposal e2• The "king on 
the mountain" rule specified that the last proposal to receive a 
majority would be the winner. If neither received a majority, 
however, the status quo would remain in effect -- i.e., there would be 
no resolution unless and until the Budget Committee reconvened and 
decided to report a resolution to the floor again. Thus uncertainty 
accompanies the tentative status quo outcome, s. 
To illustrate the possibility of inaccurate anchors and biased 
estimates of ideal points12 in such situations, we assume that the 
alternatives on the given agenda can be represented on a single 
Figure 5 
Bias From an Agenda with Uncertainty 
? 
Rule: 
a. Agenda
KEY 
Vote on 01; Vote on 02; 
Last to receive majority wins. 
Republican Substitute 
Budget Committee Resolution 
Status Quo or a future, 
unknown resolution. 
17a 
x: estimated 
ideal points 
Figure 5 (cont.) 
b. True Ideal Points and Votes 
c. Biased and Unbiased Estimates 
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dimension, even though the budget resolution on which the example is 
patterned fails to conform to this view. On the vote for the 
Republican substitute, e1 , the distribution of supporters is symmetric 
(see figure Sb) , so x (Y 1) = e1• Thus the anchor, A1 in figure Sc, 
accurately pairs the mean score of supporters, s (Y 1) ,  with the value 
of the proposal, el. 
However, if the proposal fails (as indeed the Republican 
substitute did) , the rule states that the second vote is a choice 
between the committee' s resolution, e2 and the status quo, S, the 
latter of which is plagued with uncertainty. If during the vote 
between S and e2, a homogeneous and nonmoderate group defects from the 
otherwise symmetric supporting coalition, then the mean ideal point 
supporters, x(Y 2) ,  will necessarily move toward the nondefecting tail 
of the distribution as will the mean score s (Y 2) ,  in figure Sc. Thus, 
the anchor point, A2, is inaccurate, and subsequent estimates of ideal 
points will be biased, with the degree of bias increasing for members 
with extreme scores as illustrated by the lines in Sc. 
Such situations may arise when members of one faction, say 
liberals, harbor expectations about future alternatives significantly 
different from their colleagues' expectations, In this example, 
liberal Democrats apparently expected that recommital would ultimately 
lead to a more liberal resolution. If in contrast expectations and 
uncertainty were more evenly distributed � in effect making a 
symmetric distribution of supporters for alternatives -- then 
defections would be balanced, anchors would be accurate and, finally, 
19 
estimates would be unbiased. 
Nonuniformly distributed sophistication. A final potentially 
confounding influence is closely related to the possibility of 
systematically different expectations, namely, systematically 
differing exercises of sophistication, If the formal agenda is well­
defined and members can easily identify sophisticated voting 
strategies but are somehow constrained from employing them, 13 then the 
same kind of bias as that shown in figure Sc may occur if 
sophisticated voters within the set of supporters of motions are not 
symmetrically distributed. 
In general, anchors will be inaccurate whenever the true ideal 
points of the set of supporters make up a distribution whose mean is 
not centrally located� i.e., a distribution that is not symmetric, 
Unfortunately, straightforward tests for inaccuracy do not exist 
whereas the true ideal points are unobservable. The only recourse is 
to consider carefully the legislative situation at hand in order to 
judge the appropriateness of the technique. In the case of NSF 
authorizations, a careful reading of the Congressional Record and of 
Congressional Quarterly's account of the decision reveals no 
suggestion that confounding conditions exist, but legislative 
situations often are more complex. Thus McCrone' s warning in his 
study of voting strategies is equally relevant for estimation of ideal 
points: "there is no substitute for informed use of roll call data" 
(1977, p. 181) . 
IV. SUMMARY 
The technique appears well-suited for testing hypotheses about 
aggregate outcomes in relatively simple legislative settings. With 
respect to authorizations for the National Science Foundation for 
fiscal year 1983, the policy proposals, agenda, and legislative 
strategies were sufficiently tidy to permit straightforward tests of 
three hypotheses. We found no support for the deference hypothesis, 
little support for Black's theorem, and moderate support for the 
majority median hypothesis. 
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The principal point, however, pertains not to NSF authorizations 
but rather to future research. Specifically, the demonstration 
suggests that more systematic applications of the technique will 
advance the study of legislative behavior beyond mere searches for 
empirical regularities at the individual level, to tests of micro­
level theories that predict aggregate outcomes. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Major earlier works include MacRae (1958, 1970) , Kingdon (1973) , 
Clausen (1973) , and Jackson (1974) . See also Weisberg's (1972) 
comparative discussion of proximity and Guttman scaling, 
McCrone's (1977) application of Guttman scaling, Enelow's (1981) 
use of ADA scores to identify a form of sophisticated voting, 
Poole and various colleagues' ongoing research employing 
multidimensional unfolding techniques (1981-1983) , and several 
analyses of alignments and voting change over time, including 
Sinclair (1977) , Asher and Weisberg (1978) , and Smith (1981 ) .
2. Throughout the paper the "scores" to which we refer are interest 
groups' ratings of MCs. Whereas such ratings are frequently and 
perhaps justifiably criticized, we hasten to stress that the 
technique can be applied using other scores that are more complex 
functions of votes than are interest group ratings. Bear in 
mind, however, that any such scores carry with them additional 
assumptions, such as cardinality, linearity, sincere voting, etc. 
3. With more than two anchors, and hence degrees of freedom, the 
parameters could be estimated with a simple regression.
Similarly, linear estimation is not required although theoretical 
and empirical guidance for alternative functional forms is 
scanty. 
4. Although the location of the status quo can be important in 
actual settings (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978) , we defer its 
discussion to section III. 
5. Formally, Aj is accurate if �(Yj) = ej' where x (Yj) is the 
average true ideal point of members voting yea on ej. 
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6, The bill also contained a provision for authorization of funds 
for fiscal 1982, Its inclusion, however, was Q!:Q forma, and the 
value of the 1982 provision remained constant and inspired no 
objections in the course of the debate and amendment process. 
See the Congressional Record of the Proceedings and Debates of 
the 97th Congress, Second Session, May 19, 1982, pp. 2310-2330. 
7. Other scores such as ADA, ACA and COPE, are similarly defensible, 
However, a review of the roll call votes on which such scores 
were based for the 1982 session suggested that LWV scores were 
more focused on domestic issues. The results were compared with 
estimates using ADA scores, and differences were minor. 
8. The NSF case suggests a couple of possibilities, The Democratic 
amendment (1.089) was near the Democratic median (1.085) ; the 
Republican amendment (1.069) was farther from, and more moderate 
than, the Republican median (1.062) -- perhaps strategically 
placed to attract Democratic votes needed for passage. 
9. See ''Massive Arms Aid Drafted for Salvador", Los Angeles Times, 
January 10, 1984, p. 1. 
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10. Amendments were permitted when the appropriations measure reached 
the floor of the House (and likewise in the Senate) , The 
intermediate result was appropriation of $126 million, which was 
later increased to the final le,.vel of $196, 5 million after Duarte 
visited Congress and Reagan moderated his initial $400 million 
request to $243 million, 
11. See the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1982, pp. 192-193. 
12. An estimated ideal point, xi' is biased if E(xi) f xi. The 
relationship between accuracy of anchors (see footnote 5, supra) 
and bias of ideal point estimates will soon become clear. 
13. See for example, Denzau, Riker and Shepsle, 1984. 
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